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Corruption: A Review 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A common lament by many social scientists writing in the sixties and seventies has 
been the lack of research on corruption1. In fact the absence of work from an 
economics perspective is more striking. Until recently, corruption received 
attention mostly from political scientists, sociologists and historians. However, this 
seems to have changed in recent year. There is now a growing literature on 
corruption2 in economics.  
The change in attitude can be attributed to two main forces. First, corruption is 
now perceived as a major problem facing many countries- especially the 
developing ones. In fact the World Bank website cites corruption as the single 
most important obstacle to development. The issue of corruption is not confined to 
national boundaries with foreign investors and aid organizations showing 
increasing concerns. Second, perhaps more importantly, in recent years economists 
have increasingly looked at the functioning of non-market organizations and the 
various incentive problems and informational issues associated with it. Corruption 
naturally fits into such a framework. We shall discuss this conceptual framework 
later in this essay. 
 The phenomenon of corruption is certainly very old. References to bribery and 
the punishments for bribery can be found in many ancient sources like The Code of 
Hammurabi, king of Babylon (22nd century B.C.), The Eddict of Harmhab, king of 
Egypt (14th century B.C.) and Kautilya’s Arthasastra3  (14th century B.C.). 
Corruption is as old as the notion of kingdom itself. What is perhaps new is the 
widespread nature and deep rooted structure of corruption that many modern or 
modernizing societies are now faced with.  
                                                 
1 See Myrdal (1968), Nye (1967) among others.  Myrdal finds it “almost a taboo as a research topic”. 
Similarly, commenting on lack of any historical research in France, Waquet (1991) notes in a similar 
vein : “It reflects a historiographic perspective which, although it recognizes the existence of 
corruption, does not make an issue of it”.  
2 See excellent surveys by Bardhan (1997), Jain (2001), Andvig and Fjeldstad (2001). 
3 Kautilya lists various ways of financial misbehaviour by civil servants and enumerate the nature of 
these acts and corresponding penalties. This work is suggestive of not only the illegal nature of these 
acts, but also the inevitability of such corrupt behaviour in an agency setting! 
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Corruption can take many different forms including bribery, extortion and 
embezzlement. The multi-dimensional and context specific nature of corruption 
makes it hard to define in an inclusive way. Various scholars have defined 
corruption in many different ways. Even when we confine ourselves to a primarily 
economic viewpoint, it is possible to come up with various definitions. In the 
minimalist version, corruption can be defined as ‘behaviour that deviates from 
formal duties because of private gains’. Since corruption is mostly associated with 
governments, many scholars would use ‘duties of a public role’ rather than simply 
duties. A useful working definition adopted by many authors would view 
corruption as ‘misuse of public office for private gains’.  One can also add legal 
and moral dimensions by adding terms like ‘illegal’ and ‘improper’ to the above 
definitions4.  For most of the articles in this volume, what constitutes a corrupt act 
is fairly obvious in the specific contexts under investigation. 
 In this essay, we try to provide a rather long overview of the economics of 
corruption. Some issues have been dealt at length  and in some cases, references 
have been provided for the readers to pursue their interests further. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
“ A complicated society abounds in agency relations which increase the opportunity for 
appeals to private interest, since operations which the individual was once able to perform 
for himself pass through intermediaries, each one of which is a relay of potentially 
distorting private motives”  Harold D. Lasswell,  Bribery, Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences.  
 
Corruption as a phenomenon is always associated with an agency structure. An 
agency relationship arises when two individuals enter a non-market (contractual) 
relationship and where one individual (commonly termed as the Principal) relies on 
another individual (commonly referred to as the Agent) to carry out certain actions 
on his behalf. The actions of the agent affect the principal’s payoff in a significant 
way. Problems arise in such relationships when (i) the principal and the agent have 
                                                 
4  The legal and moral aspects seem important because some scholars argue that in certain instances 
people engage in seemingly corrupt acts openly without being aware of its moral and legal status.  This 
view is not shred by many (see Waquet (1991)). See Noonan (1984) for an in-depth and fascinating 
account of these issues. Similarly, Rose-Ackerman (1978) would focus on the legality of various 
payments irrespective of the nature of the outcome. 
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dissimilar objectives and (ii) the principal is unable to write comprehensive 
enforceable contract with the agent regarding the desired course of action. The 
inability to achieve such contractual solutions arises because of several reasons- 
lack of full information, lack of verifiable information and presence of unforeseen 
contingencies.  
However, for corruption to emerge, we need another agency relationship 
which is embedded into the first one. For example, relationships between 
government and tax payers, regulator and firm, police authority and potential 
criminals, government provider of services and potential recipients can all be 
viewed as agency relationships. In all these cases, there exists conflict of interests.  
The principal also lacks sufficient information. Based on whatever information 
available, the principal tries to put an incentive scheme in place so as to induce 
optimal action by the agent. This brings another agency structure into the picture; 
the principal uses another agent to implement this incentive scheme.  
Take the case of pollution control by firms. The regulatory authority is 
interested in achieving some target level of pollution. However, firms find it costly 
to take pollution reducing measures and may not minimise pollution. To make 
them do so, the authority will put some incentive scheme in place. This will 
include auditing of firm’s pollution levels and a scheme of rewards and 
punishments for low and high levels of pollution respectively. Given that there will 
be many firms and the authority may not possess the required expertise to study 
pollution levels, the authority would have to hire another agent- the pollution 
inspector- to do the inspection. This is important because we would not see the 
inspector if the authority could design a mechanism such that the firms would 
choose required pollution levels without any inspection. In many ways the role of 
the inspector will be determined by the incentive mechanism which the principal 
has for the firm. For example a tax inspector would have much more significant 
role than a traffic inspector because in the latter case there are simpler laws and 
traffic violations are easier to detect.  Similarly, if firms do get punished by the 
market (consumers deserting the firm) for supplying low quality products, the 
quality control authority would not need any incentive mechanism and the quality 
inspector would have no role at all. 
But the inspector’s objective may not be aligned with that of the regulatory 
authority. In that case, the regulatory authority has to design a suitable incentive 
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scheme for the inspector so that the inspector audits properly and reports truthfully 
about the extent of pollution.   
Various authors have used this agency framework to analyse corruption. The 
early work by Rose-Ackerman (1978) focuses mainly on the agency relationship 
between the authority and the inspector. Corruption arises when “some third 
person, who can benefit by the agent’s actions, seeks to influence the agent’s 
decision by offering him a monetary payment which is not passed on to the 
principal”. In our example, a polluting firm is the third person. Similarly5, 
Klitgaard (1988) uses what he calls a principal-agent-client relationship, where the 
regulator is the principal, the inspector the agent and the firm is the client. In 
economics, principal –agent problem has received lot of attention since 1970s but 
the extension to the issue of corruption is only recent. Some economists also 
describe this as principal-supervisor-agent relationship.  
It is obvious that many economic scenarios would not fit into a simple agency 
framework and would require us to look at more complex relationships. Likewise, 
can all forms of corruption be studied in such a framework? The above analysis 
suggests that bureaucratic corruption, corruption in many enforcement agencies do 
fit easily to an agency framework. On the other hand, political corruption 
(corruption by politicians) would require us to extend the framework. We can view 
citizens as principals and the elected representatives as agents. The nature of the 
incentive system is however very different. Apart from affecting the re-election of 
a politician, the citizens have limited control over the incentive mechanism. 
Moreover, the analysis of multiple principals throws new issues which are rather 
different and more complex6. 
The agency perspective is obviously micro-theoretic. Some authors take a 
more macro perspective and focus on the broader socio-economic structure. This 
would include the nature and the role of formal state institutions, the divide 
between economic and political sphere, the development of market and other 
                                                 
5 Political scientist Edward Banefield uses a similar framework in his analysis of corruption being more 
severe in government than in the private sphere, see Banefield (1975). 
6 The analysis of high level corruption has not received much attention. Rose-Ackerman (1978) is an 
early contribution. The recent rent-seeking literature uses a multiple-principals approach to model 
related issues. We shall discuss the related issue of `capture’ later in this essay. 
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institutions.  Myrdal (1968)7 argues that corruption is associated with lack of 
developments in the economic sphere as well as the public sphere of responsibility 
and power. While the economic sphere lacks proper market and profit motive, 
profit considerations have found a ‘market’ in the public sphere. According to him, 
these are remnants of pre-capitalist traditional society. In this view, corruption is 
part of the remaining traditionalism of modernizing societies. However, corruption 
seems to be more than a transitory phenomenon and we need to investigate the 
nature of these ‘market like’ transactions in the public sphere. 
We shall look at three broad categories of such relationships. It will be useful 
to classify the relationships according to the extent of power and responsibilities 
enjoyed by the supervisor. As discussed earlier, informational asymmetry and 
contractual incompleteness are the two main sources of such power. First, the 
supervisor may have a purely information gathering role. In such a case, power 
will come from the ability to manipulate such information. Most enforcement 
(regulatory enforcement, tax enforcement, policing) problems would fall into this 
category. Second, the principal might set some broad objectives for the supervisor 
but the supervisor would have the power to choose the exact incentive mechanism 
for the agent. Principal has some control, but delegates not only the 
implementation but also the design of the incentive mechanism. High level 
bureaucratic corruption in policy design, delivery of public services would 
resemble this scenario. The bureaucrat might have a rough target (so many poor 
people to receive the public services, so much of revenue to be generated) but 
otherwise has full control. Third, the principal might simply transfer all the power 
to the supervisor. In this case, the supervisor would resemble a monopoly. Issuing 
of licenses, permits etc where guidelines are virtually non-existent or non-
operational would resemble this monopoly case. 
Tirole (1986)8 looks at the collusion possibilities between the supervisor 
(inspector) and the agent (firm) in a framework of the first type. In his analysis, the 
supervisor has a purely information gathering and reporting role. The principal’s 
policy towards the agent depends on this information. For example in many 
regulatory settings regulator’s policy towards the firm would depend on the cost or 
                                                 
7 This view (neo-patrimonialism) is shared by many other political scientists. However, Myrdal does 
not share the functional role of corruption associated with many leading scholars like Huntington 
(1968), Nye (1967) or Leff (1964). 
8 See Tirole (1992) also for a review of many of the issues. 
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demand conditions of the firm. Similarly, in tax collection, it would depend on the 
individual’s income levels and other individual specific information. In all these 
settings optimal policy is sensitive to agent related information. Since the principal 
and the agents do not share the same objective, optimal policy under incomplete 
information would leave large amount of rents to the agents. This gives rise to the 
scope for collusion between the supervisor and the agent- by manipulating the 
report to the principal the supervisor and the agent can share the rent. In such 
situations, the principal has to settle for policies which limit the amount of rent that 
can be appropriated through such collusion. In addition, the principal would also 
have an incentive mechanism for the supervisor, so that collusion can be 
prevented9.  In that sense it highlights the importance of designing suitable 
incentive schemes for the enforcement agencies or the bureaucracy. It can be 
shown that collusion possibilities limit the range of policies which the principal 
can implement. More specifically, it is not possible to implement more high 
powered incentive schemes for the agent. In many cases it is also desirable to limit 
the discretion of the supervisor. If the ability of the supervisor in manipulating the 
information and the value of such manipulation can be reduced then collusion 
possibilities are also reduced and it would be easier to prevent collusion. For 
example, better information and supervision technology would make manipulation 
difficult. Its importance in the tax enforcement context has been noted, where 
greater automation and computerised cross-matching would reduce the corruptible 
tax inspector’s ability to distort information and would reduce the scope for 
collusion with the tax evader. 
There is now a sizeable literature on collusion and mechanism design with 
collusion possibilities10. However, in much of the work, the distortion is only in 
one direction11. The supervisor takes a bribe (side payment) to submit an agent 
favourable report. Depending on the nature of the information, it is also possible 
that the supervisor can submit an agent-unfavourable report. In such a case, bribery 
                                                 
9 We have to be careful in interpreting this; at the optimum collusion need not be completely prevented. 
The optimal level would depend on the cost and benefits of preventing collusion. 
10 Not all forms of collusion can be viewed as corruption however. For example the principal might be 
dealing with several agents (horizontal organisation) and in this case agents might collude and this can 
be beneficial to the agent. In dealing with corruption, it is more appropriate to restrict attention to 
collusion in organisations with vertical structure. 
11 Harassment and extortion have received attention recently in various contexts. See Polinsky-Shavell 
(2001) in a general enforcement context and  Hindriks et.al. (1999) in a tax evasion context. See Margit 
et.al.(2000 ), Mookherjee (1997) and Mishra (1998) also. 
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might still occur but as a form of extortion. Now the agent will be bribing the 
supervisor not to distort the true information, as opposed to the previous case 
where the agent bribes the supervisor to distort the information. 
Extortion is as important as the study of collusion.  If by paying a bribe to the 
inspector, I can avoid penalty for tax evasion then I will be tempted to evade taxes. 
Similarly, if by being an honest tax payer I might be subject to extortion by the 
inspector, I will be equally encouraged to evade taxes. Hence, both forms of 
corruption lead to distortion of incentives.  
Prevention of collusion between the supervisor and the agent has received lot 
of attention. This ranges from design of various incentive schemes (reward/penalty 
for the supervisor) to organization design (layers of supervision). In many of these 
cases one can design mechanism which can prevent collusion. However, it is not 
clear how they affect the extortionary behaviour of the supervisor. Do these 
schemes, proposed to prevent collusion, help reduce extortion as well or do they 
encourage extortion? Is it possible to design mechanisms which prevent both forms 
of corruption?  It appears that there is a basic conflict between these two 
objectives. 
Banerjee (1997) models a situation which is somewhat similar to our second 
type of agency setting. Suppose the principal wants to sell some given number of 
permits (goods) to a population of individuals. Individuals differ in terms of the 
value of the permits. One group (high type) can get more value out of this good 
than the other group (low type). If these permits are in short supply (so that some 
individuals have to manage without this good), efficiency requires that that the 
high type should get first and the remaining would be allocated to the low types. It 
is not possible to rely on the market to achieve this outcome because the ability to 
pay need not be in perfect match with the value of the permit. Some individuals are 
wealth constrained. To simplify the analysis, one can assume that all individuals 
have the same ability to pay and it is less than the value of the permit to the high 
type. In the absence of any market, suppose the principal entrusts an agency (a 
bureaucrat) to achieve this objective. Both the government and the bureaucrat can 
not observe the value attached to the permit by the individuals, but the number of 
each type in the population is known. In addition, the government also can not 
observe the actual mechanism (i.e. prices) used by the bureaucrat. So we have two 
agency problems- the low type would always want to claim to be the high type so 
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as to get the good for sure and the bureaucrat would like to maximise his welfare 
rather than care about the efficiency goal of the government.  
Banerjee assumes that it is possible to sample the sale of permits ex post and 
the government can find the exact number of permits which were sold to the low 
type. In that case, the government can stipulate the number of permits that should 
be sold to the low type and it can punish the bureaucrat for any upward deviation12. 
For suitable punishment levels, it is possible to implement the outcome where all 
the high types get the permit and the remaining goes to the low type. What is the 
problem then?  
The problem arises from the government’s inability to observe the allocation 
mechanism used by the bureaucrat. Suppose the government wants the following 
mechanism to be chosen. Individuals are offered two prices- a high price PH which 
guarantees the sale of a permit and a low price PL such that individuals would get 
the permit with a probability strictly less than one and pay this price. One can 
choose the prices and the probability in such a way that the low types would 
choose the low price deal and the high type would choose the guaranteed sale at 
high price. It is clear that the bureaucrat would not like to use this mechanism 
because it gives him a very low price from the low types. At the same time it can 
not charge the high types any higher price without violating incentive 
compatibility. It can not charge a higher price without increasing the probability of 
sale, but the latter can not be changed without affecting the final outcome. This is 
where red tape and bureaucratic inefficiency creeps in. Since red tape is costly for 
the individuals, the bureaucrat can introduce red tape for the high types and charge 
a higher price for the low type. This way, the incentive compatibility conditions 
would still be met; the low type would not proclaim to be high type because of the 
costly red tape associated with it. Hence red tape is artificially created so that the 
bureaucrat can extort more. 
This arises because of too much delegation without any monitoring. Notice 
that the bureaucrat collects the proceeds from the sale and has full control over the 
prices. This may not match up to the popular description of salaried bureaucrats. 
Suppose we introduce monitoring in the sense that the government can detect the 
prices being charged by the bureaucrat with some positive probability. Then the 
                                                 
12 Note that the problem of collusion of the type discussed earlier does not exist in this case.  
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government can not only ask the bureaucrat to achieve certain outcome, it can also 
specify the prices to be charged. Failure to charge these prices can lead to 
punishment. If there are limits on these punishments, some bureaucrats will 
continue to charge higher than stipulated prices and use red tape. But unlike the 
previous paragraph, now these higher prices are illegal and the bureaucrat is 
engaging in illegal money making or corruption.  
The key theme here is the deliberate use of bureaucratic inefficiency and red 
tape as an extortion mechanism.   This is contrary to the view that bribery exists to 
overcome red tape. We shall visit this issue again in the later section. One can 
think of many allocation and public distribution problems which would share this 
general structure.  
Note that in the previous analysis, the government could observe the quantity 
supplied by the bureaucrat (in the form of how many permits and to whom). 
Suppose the government has no control over quantity as well. Then we have a 
situation of a bureaucrat becoming an effective monopoly supplier of these 
permits. This would lead to output distortions as well.  In the previous model, if the 
supply of permits could be raised, then red tape and corruption would decrease. In 
the monopoly situation, the bureaucrat could prefer to do the exact opposite. The 
bureaucrat could create a shortage so that it can extort higher payments for the 
permits. Shleifer and Vishny (1992)13 argue that pervasive shortages under 
socialism could be understood in terms of such bribe seeking behaviour.  This view 
might seem extreme but it does point out the serious problem of bureaucracy trying 
to maintain and strengthen its monopoly position in various ways so as to increase 
its extortion payments. This monopoly model has been used by various authors to 
analyse the distortionary effects of corruption.  
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
How does one measure corruption? What do we mean by corruption level going up 
or down? There is no clear answer to these questions. Measurement issues have 
posed a bigger problem then their conceptual counterpart. Even if we narrow down 
the focus of corruption to bribery, there is no single measure of the extent or the 
level of bribery. It is not clear whether the average amount of bribes in a given 
market, or the number of people having to pay a bribe or the total volume/value of 
                                                 
13 See Shliefer and Vishny (1993, 1994) also. 
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bribe should be identified with the level of corruption. Even when we are able to 
measure corruption by some means in a given market or sector, it is not clear how 
it can be aggregated at the economy level. Different branches of the government 
(legislature, bureaucracy, judiciary, police) might exhibit different degrees of 
corruption. Fortunately, we don’t have to agree on a specific measure because in 
most cases the measurement issue is dictated by the nature of information 
available.  
Irrespective of its legal status, corrupt acts are always held in secrecy and it is 
difficult to unearth systematic information on corruption. To a large degree 
research in corruption has suffered on this account. Early discussion on corruption 
tends to rely on journalistic accounts in newspapers and reports, anecdotal 
evidence or in few of the cases, on prosecutorial evidence. Some researches have 
conducted more detailed case studies through interviews and indirect evidence. For 
example, Wade (1982) looks at corruption in the canal irrigation system in South 
India, Putnam (1993) looks at bureaucratic inefficiency in different regions of Italy 
and De Soto (1989) analyses corruption in government in the Latin American 
context. These are all systematic and valuable studies throwing light on many 
issues using descriptive and narrative methods. Some authors have tried to study 
corruption indirectly by making inferences from related data14. The problem is 
similar to the estimation of the black economy where only indirect measures can be 
used. 
Mauro (1995) first used modern statistical tools to analyse the relation 
between corruption and growth. He used data from a commercial organization 
Business International which conducted an extensive survey of large number of 
business risk factors including corruption for 52 countries. It used a large network 
of correspondents who were asked about the extent to which business practices in 
these countries involved corruption or illegal payments.  So these were actually 
corruption perception measures- amount of corruption perceived by the 
correspondents. Since then there have been many such perception measures, the 
most popular one being the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency 
                                                 
14 See Li (1999) for a study of corruption under China’s Dual-Track system. Li uses market values of 
output and input quotas to estimate the amount of corruption proceeds. 
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International15. Since these are perception measures, all the aggregation and 
measurement issues discussed in the previous paragraph do not arise. 
Transparency International has been publishing these indices on an annual 
basis and it now covers over a hundred countries. Its index is based on many 
different polls conducted by several independent organizations. These polls use 
different methods and different sets of questionnaires about business environment 
and corruption. Because of the vagueness involved it is no surprise that all these 
surveys correlate very well and the construction of the index is considered reliable. 
Despite its widespread use in academic work, this index has attracted a lot of 
criticism from various quarters. Recently, the World Bank Institute has published a 
‘control of corruption’ measure along similar lines. However, both rankings are 
very similar and degree of correlation is very high. Clearly, all these perception 
indices involve perception biases, endogeneity and aggregation problems. But that 
has not stopped researchers from using them to study how corruption relates to 
various country level macro variables. 
Mauro finds that countries with high CPI exhibits lower growth rates. 
Investment is also negatively related to CPI. Similarly, the relationships between 
corruption and macroeconomic variables16 like Foreign Direct Investment, Flows 
of Foreign Aid, Openness of the Economy, Public Expenditure and Industrial 
Policy have been investigated along similar lines.  In one of the most extensive 
cross-country study, Treisman (2000) looks the causes of corruption. He considers 
a number of variables like Protestant traditions, histories of British rule, level of 
development measured as per capita income, level of imports and level of 
democracy; to examine the cross country variations in the various corruption 
perception indices.  We shall come across many other similar studies in later 
sections. Apart from the fact that these studies neglect many country characteristics 
and carry the problems associated with corruption indices, there is also the problem 
of most of the dependent variables being highly correlated. The search for suitable 
instruments has been a key issue.  
More recently, there have been attempts to use more direct measures of 
corruption. The World Bank conducted a Business Environment and Enterprise 
                                                 
15 It is a non-profit organization committed to spreading awareness about corruption and fighting 
corruption internationally. See their website (www. transparency.de). It ranks various countries on a 
score of 0 to 10, with a low score implying greater corruption. 
16 See Wei (1997), Tanzi and Davoodi  (1997), Ades and Di Tella (1997) for some of these exercises. 
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Performance Survey (BEEPS) in 1999, where selected firms in a set of 26 
countries (mostly transition countries) were asked various questions about the 
extent of bribe payments and the reasons for making such payments. Similarly, 
World Bank initiated another such survey in Uganda (with the Uganda Private 
Sector Foundation) to collect data on various constraints facing private enterprises. 
In general, these surveys take care to elicit bribe related information from the 
firms. Firms are seldom asked about their own payments- rather they are 
encouraged to talk about average payment made by a similar firm in the industry. 
In some of the studies, firms are asked about national averages. A number of 
authors have used these firm level17  data on bribe payments to ask more micro-
theoretic questions. Svensson (2003) shows that firms differ in their bribe 
payments and that these payments depend on the firm’s ability to pay and power to 
refuse. Johnson et.al. (1999) show that bureaucratic corruption is significantly 
associated with hiding output.  Firms, under-reporting sales pay substantial bribes 
to corrupt officials. However, the direction of causality is not well established. On 
one hand, it is possible that firms tend to hide sales to avoid bribe demands from 
extorting individuals. On the other hand, firms may be using bribes to avoid 
detection  of their illegal hiding of output and sales. Hellman et.al. (2000) use 
similar firm level data to explain corruption as a function of the governance 
structure.  
Although these studies are encouraging, they are also based on perceptions to 
some extent. Moreover, all these studies suffer from a ‘victimization bias’. Only 
firms, who have been victims of corruption rather than beneficiaries are likely to 
report. Firms might also be paying bribes to corrupt officials to escape genuine 
legal payments or to hide their non-compliance. Clearly such bribe payments will 
never be reported.  
 
4. Some Issues in the Study of Corruption 
 
4.1 Costs and Benefits of Corruption 
The various negative effects of corruption have been well documented, 
theoretically as well as empirically. It adversely affects allocation of resources 
                                                 
17 In some other cases, individuals have asked about their corruption experience. See Seligson (2002) 
for more on this. 
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(including human resources), distorts the incentive mechanisms and reduces 
efficiency leading to lower investment, growth and income. But, can corruption be 
beneficial in any particular context? This question has been asked by many social 
scientists. Some social scientists emphasize the fact that corruption may be 
efficient and stress the functional characteristics of bribery in holding some 
economic and political systems together18. Bribes are seen as necessary tools to 
“grease the wheels” of commerce by cutting down red tape and improving 
efficiency19.   This might seem true in some cases from a partial equilibrium 
perspective. If there are rigid and inappropriate laws already in place and bribe 
payments can be used to circumvent these then efficiency is perhaps enhanced. 
However, this view has been rejected by most economists20. As Myrdal pointed out 
in his early work21, this view ignores the fact that such payments would encourage 
bureaucrats to increase rigidity and red tape in the bureaucracy to extract greater 
bribe payments. A similar argument was discussed earlier in the context of 
Banerjee’s model. In fact, once such corrupt practice spreads and corruption is 
perceived to be rampant, honest officials would also tend to increase red tape by 
spreading and sharing responsibility to the maximum extent possible. This is not 
because they want to extract bribes but because they don’t want to be responsible 
for any decision where they could be accused of bribery.   
The grease hypothesis does not find much empirical support as well.  
Kaufman and Wei (1999) use firm level data from three different surveys covering 
more than two thousand firms and find no support for the hypothesis. Rather, they 
observe that bribes and measures of official harassment are positively correlated 
across firms. They examine the relationship between bribe payment by firms and 
various measures of effective bureaucratic harassment both within and across 
                                                 
18  Robert Merton’s fascinating study of American machine politics clearly set out this intellectual 
tradition. Machine politics reached a peak at the turn of the century when corruption of various forms 
thrived. However, there was no systematic attempt to remove these because of the several latent 
functions they fulfilled. 
19 See Huntington (1967), Leff (1964), Nye (1967) and Scott (1972). According to Huntington, “ In the 
context of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society  with rigid, over-centralized dishonest 
bureaucracy, is one with a rigid, over-centralized, honest bureaucracy”.  
20 There are a few exceptions though, Lui (1995) shows that bribery can enhance efficiency in a 
specific queuing context. However, this result can not be extended to more general contexts. 
21 Myrdal  refers to the Santanam Committee report which discusses ‘speed money’ and come to the 
view that “ Besides being a most objectionable corrupt practice, this custom of speed money has 
become one of the most serious causes of delay and inefficiency”. 
 15
different countries included in the survey22. They argue that corruption-prone 
officials can often “customise” the nature and amount of harassment on firms to 
extract maximum bribes possible and charge according to the firm’s “ability to 
pay”. Similar findings have also been noted by other survey based studies by 
Svensson (2003) and Seligson (2002). 
From a political science perspective also this view of the functional role of 
bribery has not been widely accepted. High levels of corruption have been 
associated with political instability rather than stability. Seligsson (2002) examines 
how corruption tends to diminish citizen’s trust and faith in democratic 
governance.  Johnston (1998) also does not favour the politically integrative role of 
corruption and argues that it also has many disintegrative features.  
Critics of the functionalist view would also point out that if corruption did 
serve important functions, then one would have seen legalization of these 
practices23. However, as Waquet (1991) points out, in many cases these 
dysfunctions and functions of corruption may not be manifest, they may be latent 
in which case they are unrecognized and unintended. He analyses a number of 
corrupt practices in seventeenth century Florence (Grand Duchy of Tuscany) and 
argues that while the dysfunctions were manifest, the functions were latent. That 
would explain the presence of repressive laws to control corruption whose function 
“was not only to control corruption but also render it tolerable”. 
Irrespective of whether one agrees with the functionalist interpretation or not, 
there is no denying the fact that corruption is present many societies in the 
governmental sphere.  This has been viewed by many as a case of government 
over-extending itself into the market place.  Politicians and bureaucrats have a 
vested interest in increasing government intervention. The optimal outcome, 
according to this view, would be a minimalist state. Government intervention 
should be minimized even in the presence of market failures. However, as Rose-
Ackerman (1978) points out, some level of corruption is inevitable in every mix of 
market and government.  Hence instead of using the existence of government 
                                                 
22 The survey covers mostly transition countries. Hence the pre and post transition governance issues 
would also have a bearing on the result. 
23 As has been pointed out by Rose-Ackerman (1978) and Shliefer and Vishny (1993), the very secrecy 
associated with bribery makes it inefficient because individuals would spend considerable resources in 
keeping the bribe transactions secret. 
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corruption as an indictment of the system, one should be looking at the trade-off 
between government corruption and market failures.  
Acemoglu and Verdier (2000)24 examine this trade-off in a simple general 
equilibrium framework. Corruption definitely increases the cost of intervention by 
the government and creates inefficiencies in terms of resource use, but it can be 
viewed as a cost associated with the benefit of government intervention. The 
general equilibrium nature of their analysis yields some insights which are not 
possible in a partial equilibrium set up. Consider the earlier example of polluting 
firms. Since polluting firms have negative externalities and there are no obvious 
market solutions, government intervenes to control pollution through the services 
of a pollution inspector. This means some resources are being wasted in buying the 
services of the inspector. In addition, if the inspector is corruptible, the government 
has to invest more resources in preventing corrupt behaviour. They show that when 
it is difficult to monitor these inspectors, government presence in the form of 
number of bureaucrats is likely to be larger, rather than smaller. Similarly, while 
desirability of government intervention decreases with rises in income levels for 
the rich countries, the exact opposite is true for poorer countries. These results 
show why one might expect to see greater government presence in many 
developing economies despite the presence of corruption. In fact, it might be 
optimal to tolerate some degree of corruption25.  
 
4.1 Incentive Payments, Wages and Compensation 
 
Earlier, in the context of the pollution example, it was pointed out that the principal 
has to design suitable incentive mechanism for the inspectors. The commonly used 
instruments of this mechanism are wages, fines and commission or performance 
pay. Low wages of bureaucrats or civil servants have generally been viewed as a 
major inducement for corrupt behaviour. This is reflected in many contemporary 
writings and policy prescriptions, as well as in some of the historical accounts of 
corruption. For example, the widespread corruption seen during the Ming regime 
                                                 
24 See Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) also. 
25 This optimality of corruption should not be viewed as a proof of its beneficial role. Rather, positive 
corruption arises in equilibrium because it is too costly to eliminate corruption completely. Similar 
results are found in many other studies. However, given that most governments are struggling to reduce 
corruption, whether one should attempt complete elimination or not seems to be a moot point. 
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in China (1368-1644) is often attributed to the extremely low wages of the 
government officials26.   
There are at least two arguments as to why low wages can push public 
officials towards corruption. First, when lowly paid officials deal with relatively 
rich clients, the income inequality and wide difference in living standards could be 
an inducement for the official to use his power in order to climb up the social and 
income ladder. Second, high wages can act as efficiency wage and this helps deter 
corrupt behaviour. Since bribe taking officials run the risk of losing their job if 
caught, high wages effectively work as fines for bribe taking. Since in most cases, 
it is difficult to implement large fines for bribery, efficiency wage has generally 
been viewed as a popular instrument for controlling corruption27. This is very 
much in line with the general thinking in the enforcement literature as well (i.e. 
Becker and Stigler (1974))28.  
However, efficiency wage relies heavily on the ability to monitor the official. 
If the probability of detection (of bribery) is small, then high wages will not work 
and the officials will continue to be corrupt29. In fact high wages would possibly 
increase their bargaining power and raise the level of bribe payments30. 
Mookherjee and Png (1995) address the issue of compensation policy and 
show that the relation corruption and compensation is not always so straight 
forward.  The issue of optimal compensation policy gets complicated because the 
principal would try to achieve two things: induce higher monitoring effort and 
prevent bribery. This is an important point which often gets neglected in 
discussions of corruption. Consider our earlier example of the pollution inspector. 
The polluting firm pays a fine upon detection of its pollution level. This requires 
two things; the inspector has to detect the actual pollution level and then report 
                                                 
26 See Huang (1974). 
27 See Klitgaard (1988), Chand and Moene (1999). Recent reforms of tax authorities in many countries 
like Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda reflect this belief. Historically also, attempts to curb corruption have 
been made through salary reforms. In Chinese case referred to in the text, salaries were raised by 
significant amount during the Qing period to reduce corruption by these officials. The presence of 
yang-lien (honesty nourishment) is also quite noteworthy in this context.  
28 From an enforcement perspective, corruption is treated as any other illegal activity except for the fact 
that we do not see efficiency type wage recommendations for prevention of all such illegal activities. 
29 Besley and McLaren (93) analyse various wage policy in the tax administration context. Efficiency 
wage does turn out to be optimal in some cases. But there are cases where it might be optimal to pay 
simply the reservation wage and let the corruptible officials take bribes, or even pay extremely low 
capitulation wages in the knowledge that the officials will collect significant bribe income.  
30 This would be true, for example, if bribes are being determined  in a bargaining framework (i.e. Nash 
bargaining) where the size of bribe would depend, among other things, on relative bargaining powers 
of the briber and the bribee. 
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truthfully. If the inspector puts too little effort in monitoring the firm but behaves 
honestly, enforcement may still be diluted.   
In their analysis, the inspector can take bribe from the firm and underreport, 
but the bribery can get detected with some probability and the inspector faces a 
penalty for bribe taking (one can include job loss also). On the other hand, the 
inspector gets a commission (on the firm’s fine) for truthful reporting.  They show 
that unless there is a large increase in the penalty for bribe taking, it may not 
eradicate bribery. So penalty for bribery and commission may work in the same 
direction in reducing corruptibility of the inspector, but they have opposite effects 
on his incentives to monitor.  But to what extent should these commissions be used 
to reduce corruption? It turns out that even though bribes do induce monitoring 
effort and also has some deterrence effect on the polluting firms bribes are an 
inefficient way of doing so. It is optimal to eradicate corruption completely by 
suitable choice of commission rates31.  
There are two issues which deserve some consideration in relation to these 
commission based schemes. First, as Mookherjee (1997) points out, there are many 
implementation issues which need to be carefully considered. Second, such 
commission schemes might encourage other forms of corruption. Note that 
commission to the inspector helps the principal in preventing collusion between the 
inspector and the firm. But this can also encourage over-reporting by the firm in 
order to get higher commission payments from the principal. In general it might 
not be possible to prevent both types of corrupt behaviour.  
There have been a few studies looking at the empirical evidence on 
relationship between public sector wages and corruption. Using a cross-country 
regression analysis for 28 countries, Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) find a 
significant negative influence of public sector salaries (relative to manufacturing 
sector wage) on the level of corruption32. However, the causality could run in the 
reverse direction as well. Since many corrupt countries are poor and have low 
budgetary outlay, salaries to public officials would tend to be low in such a sample 
of poor and corrupt countries.  
                                                 
31 However, the inspector might under-report for two reasons: either he has observed pollution and has 
taken a bribe or he has not been able observe the actual pollution level due to imperfect technology. If 
the principal is unable to distinguish between the two kinds of under-reporting, then complete bribe 
prevention will induce too much effort which will be socially wasteful. 
32 Treisman (2000), Rauch and Evans (2000) do not find strong support for this hypothesis.  
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4.2 Hierarchies, Organization and Governance 
 
It would be a relatively simple matter if the principal could directly monitor 
supervisor’s effort and honesty while enforcing the contract. But, in many cases 
this is not feasible. Moreover, given the information and other constraints faced by 
the principal he may not be able to design incentive compatible contracts to induce 
optimal effort and honest behaviour by the supervisor. It is in these contexts that 
issues of hierarchies and organizational structure assume importance. One could 
appoint a higher level supervisor to monitor the original supervisor. But the higher 
level supervisor can be corrupt as well. Despite the fact that the higher level 
supervisor is corrupt, such a hierarchy (hiring a thief to catch a thief) can be  
optimal in certain cases. On the other hand, one could have parallel supervision by 
more than one supervisor and introduce competition amongst the supervisors. It is 
generally believed that such competition can eliminate corruption.  
In many contexts, the organizational structure and incentive systems are 
related. The optimality (or otherwise) of a particular organizational design depends 
on the kind of incentive schemes that are feasible. Basu, Bhattacharya and Mishra 
(1992) raised the importance of hierarchies in the corruption context. In our 
pollution example, it can be easily seen that enforcement is diluted to the extent the 
officer is corruptible. So long as bribes are some increasing function of the penalty, 
enforcement is diluted but not eliminated altogether. In that case one can argue that 
by raising the penalty sufficiently one could achieve compliance. So the prospect 
bribery itself will discourage potential criminals! 
Suppose fines can not be raised indefinitely (e.g. Limited liability reasons). 
Then the only way to ensure compliance by the firm is to induce honest reporting 
by the officer (inspector). The officer, to that effect, can be given a reward for 
honest reporting. Unless rewards are high honest reporting may not take place. In 
that case, one can hire another officer to monitor the first officer.  Officer 2 can 
detect bribe taking by officer 1 with some probability. Now, officer 1 can be 
subject to a penalty of for taking a bribe. This threat of punishment can work to 
some extent to prevent corruption by officer 1. However, there is nothing to 
guarantee that officer 2 will honestly report.  Officer 2 can also take a bribe from 
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officer 1 and decide not to report. But the introduction of another layer of 
supervision has made bribe taking less attractive even when the second officer is 
corrupt.  
Instead of having a higher level of monitoring, one can add another layer 
horizontally. In many organizations this kind of overlapping jurisdictions is 
observed. For example, a license or permit might have to be cleared by several 
bureaucrats in different ministries. The exact nature of this overlap depends on the 
context and can vary. In our context, we can also interpret this as competition 
amongst the supervisors. Both the officers are supposed to detect pollution by the 
firm. If one of them detects pollution and reports truthfully, the polluting firm pays 
the penalty and the second officer’s action does not matter any more.  However, if 
the first officer were to take a bribe and let the firm off, then officer 2 could also 
apprehend and demand a bribe or report truthfully. Now, bribe taking is less 
attractive to the officers. It is possible to induce honesty even for small values of 
the reward. The previous discussion makes it clear that different organizational 
structures affect the corruptibility of the officers in different ways.  
 The issue of hierarchies has received some attention in studies on corruption. 
Carillo (1995) also considers a similar vertical hierarchy with penalty for 
corruption being endogenized by an internal promotion scheme (which is enforced 
by an honest super principal). Bac (1996) considers hierarchies where both 
monitoring effort and corruption are endogenously determined, but he restricts 
attention to vertical case and its variants.  Unlike the vertical hierarchy case, the 
horizontal case has not received much attention33. Kofman and Lawarree (1993) 
examine a case similar to the horizontal case. In their model, the principal hires an 
external auditor (in addition to the internal one) and makes inference about the 
honesty of the internal auditor based on both reports. But again, the external 
auditor is supposed to be always honest. Mishra (2002) contains a discussion of 
these and other related issues.  
 One can also look at a broader picture of institutional design. Scholars have 
often pointed at the over-centralized nature of bureaucracy being responsible for 
                                                 
33 Rose-Ackerman (78) is an exception which contains an early discussion of this and other hierarchies.  
Shliefer and Vishny (1993) discuss a related point – the issue of how corruption is organized. It is 
possible to have decentralized corruption with many officials competing for bribes- as opposed to 
centralized corruption. Decentralized corruption would mean lack of any co-ordination among bribe 
seekers and this would lead to greater distortion in the monopoly bribe maximization context. 
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corruption. Does this imply that decentralization of government activities would 
reduce the scope and level of corruption? Decentralization would allow for greater 
accountability and monitoring of the officer and as the previous discussion 
suggests, greater inter-jurisdictional competition.  Fishman and Gatti (2002) 
examine this relationship empirically using cross-country regressions. They find 
that fiscal decentralization is always associated with lower corruption (as measured 
by various indices). Decentralization might reduce bureaucratic corruption but it 
might give rise to other forms of corruption. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) 
analyse these issues and point out that decentralization can lead to capture of the 
local government by the local elite. The literature on corruption does not normally 
look at the issue of capture, but it has equally important efficiency implications. If 
one can influence the government during the design of the law or policy, there is 
no need to make bribe payments in order to violate the law or policy guidelines. In 
the context of delivery of public services, for example, centralized bureaucracy 
would tend to divert resources to the bribe-paying rich and local governments 
under decentralized system could be captured by the local rich for a greater share 
in these resources. They examine the trade off in great detail and examine the 
optimal design. The optimal design is sensitive to the nature of decentralization 
and the financing of the local government. 
The issue of constitutional design has also been looked at in the context of 
corruption. Some scholars34 argue that corruption is part and parcel of a particular 
stage in the development of constitutional order. Corruption is viewed as 
something which is possible only in oligarchic republics or monarchies but not in 
mature democracies. More recently, the link between democracy and corruption 
has been explored empirically. Treisman (2000) finds that the current level of 
democracy has no significant impact on the level of corruption but countries with 
long periods of democratization are perceived to be less corrupt. The corruption 
levels are based on the Transparency International’s perception indices and the 
democracy levels are from the Freedom House’s country rankings. In a similar 
study, Paldam (2002) finds that corruption in general terms would decrease with 
increasing levels of democracy but this covariance depends on the level of 
democracy.  Even if one accepts that the correlation is not spurious, it is difficult to 
                                                 
34 See Van Klaveren (1957) in Heidenheimer (1970). 
 22
accept the causality. For example, poor countries tend to be more corrupt and a lot 
of these countries are also more authoritarian. Since income levels of countries are 
strongly correlated with corruption, it is not clear to what extent growth factor are 
responsible for the observed pattern35. Moreover, the causality can run in the 
opposite direction as well. Seligson (2002) argues that widespread corruption 
erodes legitimacy and is a significant threat to democratization. Using survey data 
on selected Latin American countries, he finds a negative relation between 
people’s response to legitimacy in the political system and experience of 
corruption.  
 
4.3 Competition  
 
How is competition related to levels of corruption?  It has been argued36 that any 
reform that increases the competitiveness of the economy helps reduce corrupt 
activities. Anti-corruption strategies have generally been based on the perception, 
both in academic and policy circles; that greater competition through liberalization 
and deregulation would lead to lower levels of corruption. In one sense it might be 
argued that this is trivially true because corruption arises precisely in situations 
where market fails and government bureaucracy intervenes; so if we could have 
competitive markets, then corruption would cease to exist. But this ignores the fact 
that corruption and market competition can take place in different dimensions. For 
examples, market failures in reducing pollution or quality control would lead to the 
existence of a bureaucracy and firms could otherwise be competing in the product 
market. Hence we could have a meaningful discussion of what would happen to 
corruption following a rise in level of competition.  
Bliss and Di Tella (1997) examine this issue in a model where each firm 
operating in the market has to pay a bribe to the inspector who chooses the bribe 
amount to maximise his monopoly bribe income. The answer to whether 
competition amongst firms kills corruption is not so straight forward. First, 
competition as measured by the number of firms in the market in the free-entry 
                                                 
35 A recent study by Mohtadi et.al. (2003)  predict a U-shaped relationship. Corruption levels are high 
for countries in an early stage of democratization. Some countries at the very lower end of democracy 
do maintain corruption at an economic viable level (some East Asian countries) and achieve higher 
growth. 
36 See Rose-Ackerman (1999), Ades and di Tella (1999). 
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equilibrium depends on corruption or the amount of bribe charged by the inspector. 
If the inspector charges high bribe, high cost firms with low profits would exit the 
market. This will reduce competitive pressure and the remaining firms would have 
higher profits. Second, the equilibrium number of firms would also depend on the 
cost characteristics (i.e. fixed overhead costs). This in turn affects their profitability 
and the amount of bribe the inspector can charge. Hence it is possible that presence 
of fewer firms is associated with lower bribes payments.  
Ades and Di Tella (1999) address this question empirically using corruption 
perception data on a set of countries and various proxy measures for competition. 
They examine whether countries which are deemed to be more competitive 
according to these measures are also perceived to be less corrupt. They find a 
significant negative relationship between competitive structure of the country and 
its corruption index. When firms enjoy higher rents, bureaucrats will have greater 
incentives to engage in corruption. Note that since bureaucrats stand to loose their 
wages following detection of their corrupt activities, they will not be interested in 
corrupt activities with smaller bribe payments.  Since only firms enjoying large 
surpluses can pay large bribes, higher rents for firms would induce more 
corruption. 
Despite the results of these cross-country regressions, there is not much 
comfort in this hypothesis. The experience of many countries show that despite 
embracing considerable deregulation and liberalization, corruption may have 
increased rather than decreased. Laffont and N’Guessan (1999) show that it is 
possible to have greater corruption and competition in an agency framework. Their 
result is based on the intuition that with greater competition, the principal might 
find it optimal to tolerate corruption for a bigger range of parameters. Dutta and 
Mishra (2003) argue that the expected negative relation between corruption and 
competition holds only when one controls for other factors like credit market 
imperfections and wealth inequality37. They show that presence of imperfect 
screening in the credit market (due to wealth inequality) and corruption (collusive 
bribe payments) makes it easy for the inefficient firms to survive and stay in the 
                                                 
37 The relation between inequality and corruption is of independent interest, which we have not been 
able to explore in this essay. Dutta and Mishra (2003) show that a rise in inequality can lead to greater 
corruption (more bribe paying firms). Banrjee (1997) also contains a similar result. Gupta et.al. (2002) 
find that high levels of corruption are associated with greater inequality and poverty.  Li et.al. (2000) 
also contains another empirical investigation. 
 24
market. Hence it is possible to see large number of firms in the market (greater 
competition) with many of them engaging in corrupt practices with the public 
officials (more corruption).  It is clear that results are sensitive to the way we 
define corruption and competition; and whether we adopt a partial or general 
equilibrium approach. These issues deserve further research effort. 
It is not only economic competition which matters; our preceding discussion 
would suggest that the degree of political competition also affects the nature and 
level of corruption38.  Political competition refers to the competition among parties 
and individuals to win the support of the voters and assume office.  If a particular 
politician or political party is deemed to be corrupt then voters can punish it by not 
re-electing it. The incentive to stay in office being strong among politicians, the 
prospect of losing re-election should deter corrupt behaviour. However, as 
mentioned earlier, we are dealing with a multiple principal (voter) situation here 
and it is not easy to co-ordinate their actions. Moreover, electoral competition does 
not exactly work the way price competition works in the market. Myerson (1993) 
showed that in a simple electoral game with voters preferring less corrupt 
candidates, certain electoral rules may not succeed in preventing corrupt politician 
from getting elected. Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) test the link between 
electoral rules and corruption in a cross-country empirical study. They show that 
certain electoral systems with large voting districts are associated with less 
corruption. On the other hand proportional elections with lower weight on 
individual accountability are associated with higher corruption. 
As mentioned earlier, the political process and electoral competition can give 
rise to special interest politics and legislative capture. Grossman and Helpman 
(1996) examine how interest groups use campaign contributions to influence 
public policy. The role of campaign contribution is two fold: it serves the electoral 
motive of the group which wants to promote the prospect of the preferred 
candidate and it also serves an influence motive where the group can influence the 
policy position of the candidates. They show how both these motives interact in 
influencing the equilibrium outcome. From the candidate’s point of view, these 
contributions present a trade off. By catering to the interest group a candidate can 
get large contributions which can be used to influence ill-informed voters but since 
                                                 
38 This is obviously related to political corruption; but, in many ways, bureaucratic corruption can not 
flourish without political corruption. 
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policy platform may not coincide with the general interest, the candidate would 
loose the votes of the well-informed voters. Even though their model is abstract 
and does not deal with corruption directly, it can be extended to analyse various 
forms of capture and their implications39.  
 
4.4 Persistence 
 
Is corruption simply a manifestation of deviant behaviour from the norm or is it 
the norm itself?  The very definition of corruption would suggest that corrupt acts 
are deviations from implicit or explicit behavioural norms (with or without legal 
and ethical connotations). But, the widespread nature of corruption in some 
societies indicates that corrupt behaviour is the norm itself.  Since norms can be 
viewed as persistent behaviour, this seems to lie at the centre of the persistence 
issue. 
Economists have viewed this as a multiple equilibria problem. It has been 
noted that different societies with relatively same levels of development, judicial 
machinery and politico-legal structures can exhibit varying degrees of “illegal (pre) 
occupation” like corruption, tax evasion and other regulatory non compliance. The 
explanation for this observation is that different societies can get caught in 
different equilibria. At a general level, this multiplicity arises due to various forms 
of complementarities. For example, if people expect more people to be corrupt, 
then the expected cost of being corrupt would be less (probability of apprehension 
might be low or even the social sanction against corruption could be low) leading 
to more people being corrupt40. Like all models of multiple equilibria these models 
can not explain why some get caught in the bad equilibrium, but still aid to our 
understanding of the persistence of corruption in some societies.  
However, it is possible to argue that one can get rid of the bad equilibrium by 
making changes to the structure of incentives (rewards, penalties). For example, if 
more people are corrupt because the social sanction attached to corruption is low, 
one can augment social incentives by explicit provision of new monetary or non-
                                                 
39 See Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) for such an extension to study capture in the context of 
decentralization. 
40 Andvig and Moene (1990) showed how “corruption may corrupt” others and lead to a situation of 
widespread corruption. Likewise, Sah (1991) and Tirole (1996) focus on this multiple equilibria 
phenomenon to throw light on the persistence of crime and corruption. See also the survey by Bardhan 
(97). 
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monetary sanctions. In that case, corruption can be reduced by the provision of 
adequate incentives. This would reduce the persistence problem to the problem of 
‘choosing the right incentives’. There may be some merit in this view, since some 
societies or organisations have managed to get out of the high corruption 
equilibrium.  
Such a view ignores the fact that implementing any penalty or reward scheme 
requires an agency which needs to acquire information and then implement the 
incentives properly.  When information acquisition is costly, certain beliefs can be 
self enforcing and once again lead to equilibria with different levels of corruption 
and compliance. Mishra (1998) shows that when information acquisition is costly, 
the supervisor may not be well informed and this can lead to substantial 
(harassment) costs for innocent agents. The presence of these costs can lead to 
multiple equilibria.  
Consider a group of firms facing a certain pollution standard. The pollution 
inspector can report a non-polluting firm and the later incurs some cost. Similarly, 
a polluting firm can bribe the inspector and reduce its expected cost. Suppose 
authorities have a system of rewards and penalties to encourage reporting of 
polluting firms and discourage reporting of non-polluting firms. The inspector has 
to incur some cost (effort) to be able to distinguish a non-polluting firm from a 
polluting one. If the inspector knows the type of the firm, then the non-polluting 
firm is never reported. If the inspector is uninformed, then reporting a firm of 
unknown type would be costly if the probability of the firm being non-polluting 
type is very high. Hence the inspector’s decision to incur the cost and be informed 
depends on his belief about the firm being non-polluting type.   On the other hand, 
if the firms face an uninformed inspector, polluting becomes a more attractive 
option because of the harassment costs involved with being non-polluting.   
Hence we can have two equilibrium outcomes. We have the high-compliance 
equilibrium with fewer firms choosing to pollute and the officer choose to be 
informed. The other is the low-compliance equilibrium where the officer is 
uninformed and greater fraction of the firms chooses to pollute.   
The persistence issue can perhaps be better addressed in an evolutionary 
framework.  There are at least three motivations for focusing on an evolutionary 
approach. First, recent work on evolutionary game theory has shown that 
evolutionary stability can address the issue of equilibrium selection to some extent. 
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Since corruption happens to be one such equilibrium, we can ask what kind of 
social dynamics would select such an outcome (equilibrium). Second, the multiple 
equilibria analysis always focuses on social norms of behaviour. But we also need 
to look at individual norms of behaviour and not just social norms41.  The analysis 
of the previous paragraphs showed that we could have different compliance levels 
as different equilibria or (social) norms. One chooses to be corrupt because every 
one else is corrupt and it is normal to do so.  One would like to see how individual 
norms of behaviour would give rise to these social norms. Last, it would be 
interesting to see whether corruption persists because of imperfect information, 
underlying beliefs and the ease of collusion or it persists because corruption has a 
self-replicating nature in a very basic and primitive way. Suppose we have a set of 
honest (non corrupt) individuals. Clearly, our previous analysis suggests that there 
can not be any corruption equilibrium. Suppose we introduce some corrupt 
individuals into this population. Do we still have the no corruption equilibrium? Or 
this handful of corrupt individuals can spread and lead to a situation of pervasive 
corruption? 
Preliminary investigations suggest that corrupt or collusive behaviour is 
immune to the invasion of honest behaviour but the reverse is not true42. So 
corruption has a strong self-replicating property. This is not very surprising in the 
context of many corrupt countries where the youth look at the corrupt and 
successful as their role models and try to follow the same.  Despite its simple and 
rudimentary structure one can ask several interesting questions but we do not 
pursue them here. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Corruption is now a growing and active research area. It is clear that we have not 
been able to do justice to many of the issues and works by many researchers. There 
are also certain issues which have not received proper attention in the context of 
corruption. We list some of them below. 
                                                 
41 ‘Driving on the left or right’ can be viewed as part of social norm, since individuals would follow 
this even if there were no law specifying regarding which side to drive.  An individual living in 
different societies would follow the social norm and accordingly drive on the left or right. But the same 
individual might follow a norm ‘Drive carefully when people are crossing the road’ irrespective of 
which society he live in.  
42 See Mishra (2003) for a preliminary attempt.  
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 The organization of corruption is not very well understood. Recall that the 
contractual relation between the two parties to a bribe is an illegal one and there is 
no enforcement mechanism to enforce this contract should there be a breach.  It is 
not clear what sustains the credibility of such transactions. It seems that reputation 
factors are at operation here.  Secondly, most bribe transactions are perhaps 
facilitated by organized networks of middlemen. Despite the fact that we know 
who takes bribes and how much, it won’t be easy for us to just walk in and offer a 
bribe. It would be interesting to see how these can be incorporated into the study of 
corruption and how they would affect the anti-corruption drive. 
 The second set of issues relate to the degree of heterogeneity in the society.  
Differences in income, wealth, power, opportunities and other socio-cultural 
indicators seem to have an impact on the level of corruption. We briefly pointed 
out how income or wealth inequality issues are related to corruption. Similar 
exercises can be extended to other dimensions. 
 The third set of issues relate to the role of information. Greater transparency 
and spread of information would obviously have an impact on corruption. But a lot 
depends on whether information is ‘hard’ or ‘soft’. Soft information can be easily 
manipulated and controlled by those in power. As we discussed earlier, 
technological improvements can lead to more information being hard; but soft 
information is not going to be eliminated altogether. The credibility of the 
information provider (i.e. media) would have a significant bearing in the case of 
soft information.  
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